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Class Actions
by Thomas M. Byrne*
and Stacey McGavin Mohr"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's 2010
decisions in class actions further developed the law on the requirements
for class certification, the scope of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
2
(CAFA),' and the preclusive effects of class settlements and judgments.
I.

RULE 23(B)(3) CERTIFICATION: SACRED HEART

The year's leading class action case was SacredHeartHealth Systems,
Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Services, Inc.' The court accepted
an appeal by the defendant, Humana, from the district court's order
granting class certification. The class representatives were hospitals
that claimed that Humana systematically underpaid them for medical
services they provided to veterans under a federal program and thereby
breached its contracts with them. The controversy arose from a change
in payment policy by Humana that resulted in lower payments to the
hospitals. Humana announced the change in a letter that Humana
claimed had been sent to all of the hospitals, which a large majority of

* Partner in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Notre Dame (A.B., cum laude, 1978; J.D., magna cum laude, 1981). Law
clerk to the Hon. Robert A. Ainsworth Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit and to the Hon. Morey L. Sear of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the law firm of Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
Emory University (B.A., 2001), Duke University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude,
2007). Law clerk to the Hon. Karen Nelson Moore of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. For a review of class actions during the prior survey period, see Thomas M. Byrne
& Stacey A. McGavin, Class Actions, 2009 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 61 MERCER L. REV.

1055 (2010).
3. 601 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2010). The opinion by the court was authored by Judge
Stanley Marcus. Id. at 1164. An interlocutory appeal was granted under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(f). Sacred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1169.
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the hospitals acknowledged receiving. Several hospitals instituted a
class action asserting that Humana's contention that it was mandated
by the government program to increase its prices was false." The
Eleventh Circuit ultimately agreed with Humana that "many important
uncommon questions raised by this litigation overwhelm the one common
issue and render the case unsuitable for class treatment" and vacated
the class certification order.'
The court focused its analysis on Rule 23(b)(3)'s' requirement that
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
questions affecting only individual members.' To assess the impact of
a common question on the class members' claims, a district court
"obviously must examine not only the defendant's course of conduct
towards the class members, but also the class members' legal rights and
duties.' As the court further explained,
A plaintiff may claim that every putative class member was harmed by
the defendant's conduct, but if fewer than all of the class members
enjoyed the legal right that the defendant allegedly infringed, or if the
defendant has non-frivolous defenses to liability that are unique to
individual class members, any common questions may well be submerged by individual ones.'
The court pointed out that this principle emerged clearly from its cases
and those from other circuits.o The court agreed with Humana that
variations in the contract terms and the parties' course of dealings
overwhelmed any common issue concerning the justifications for the
change in pricing, reasoning that "common questions rarely will
predominate if the relevant terms vary in substance among the
contracts."n The court contrasted Humana's case with a prior decision,
Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.," in which the court upheld the
certification of a class of 10,000 Exxon dealers who claimed that Exxon
had breached their individual sales agreements by overcharging them. "
The contractual provision in Allapattah Services, the court reasoned, was

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Sacred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1164-66.
Id. at 1164.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Sacred Heart,601 F.3d at 1169-70.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1170-71.
333 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003), afld, 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
Sacred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1171 (citing Allapattah Serus., 333 F.3d at 1252, 1264).
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substantially the same for all class members.' 4 The Humana contracts
differed with respect to the key payment clauses, with a minimum of
roughly thirty-three variations in contract language among the 260
potential class members." After examining the differences in detail,16
the court concluded that the substantial variation found in the material
terms of the many contracts made the case "a close relative" of Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops," a Fourth Circuit decision
vacating a $390 million jury verdict on the ground of improper class
certification of multiple disparate contract claims.'8
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred by
focusing solely on the defendant's course of conduct while neglecting the
substantial differences in the contracts and the corresponding rights and
The court rejected the district court's
duties provided therein.'
suggestion of using subclasses corresponding to the six categories of
payment clauses, finding that "the six subclasses proposed here mask a
staggering contractual variety."20 Again citing Broussard,the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the plaintiffs are not permitted "to stitch together the
strongest contract case based on language from various [contracts], with
no necessary connection to their own contract rights."" The court
reasoned that the Rules Enabling Act 2 2 and due process prevent using
class actions to infringe upon the substantive rights of any party."
The court held that, based on the record, "an abridgment of the
"24
defendant's rights seems the most likely result of class treatment.
While the variations in the contractual terms alone are fatal to class
certification, the court also noted that individualized extrinsic evidence
is problematic when evaluating the class members' agreements.2 1 'The
risk of voluminous and individualized extrinsic proof runs particularly
high where a defendant raises substantial affirmative defenses to
breach. 26 The court detected a similar difficulty in applying multiple

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1172-74.
17. Id. at 1175; see Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331
(4th Cir. 1998).
18. Broussard, 155 F.3d at 334.
19. 601 F.3d at 1176.
20. Id.
21. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Broussard, 155 F.3d at 344) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
23. Sacred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1176.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1176-77.
26. Id. at 1177.
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states' laws to the extrinsic evidence." Furthermore, contrary to the
district court's finding, Humana's two principal affirmative defenses,
ratification and waiver, involved more than merely damages issues
because the two affirmative defenses could preclude liability." The
Eleventh Circuit determined that there was "no support in the text of
Rule 23 or interpretive case law for the district court's rigid distinction
between liability and damages."29 The court noted that there was no
formula or statistical analysis to resolve the individualized damages
questions, and that it was "a clear error of judgment to brush them aside
as mere 'damages' issues."'o
The court also concluded that choice of law presented another barrier
to class certification. The court reasoned that there could be considerable variations in state law governing extrinsic evidence, and that courts
have expressed skepticism about class certification in substantive areas
where the content of state law tends to differ." Although only six
states were involved, the court noted that more than a perfunctory
analysis was required of whether differences in state law would pose
insuperable management obstacles." The court cited a procedural
error by the district court in omitting a "serious analysis of the
variations in applicable state law relative to Humana's affirmative
defenses." As an illustration of the problem, the court reviewed the
law of waiver in the six states and the differences among the states in
its application.
The court briefly turned to the question, under Rule 23(bX3), of the
superiority of class adjudication and concluded that a finding of lack of
superiority was dictated by the outcome of its predominance analysis."
The court pointedly offered the additional observation that the class
members were hospitals with potentially high value claims against
Humana, "even in a borderline case, that fact might well counsel against
class treatment."36

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 1177-78.
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1180.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1180 & n.14.
Id. at 1183-84 (quoting May v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1269(11th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 1184.
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Sacred Heart is probably the court's most significant class action
opinion since Klay v. Humana, Inc." Judge Marcus's tour de force
opinion is likely to frame the issues in many future class certification
controversies. The court's exacting and detailed analysis exhibits little
tolerance for deferring the hard questions of how a case could be tried
as a class action until after certification. Sacred Heart is the court's first
extended recognition of the due process issues lurking when a court
certifies a class by "glossing over" material differences in the claims of
class members." The Eleventh Circuit's heavy reliance on the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Broussard, a staple of briefs opposing class
certification, is noteworthy." Sacred Heart is also the first Eleventh
Circuit case to squarely require that the proponent of class certification
provide "an extensive analysis of state law variations" to determine if
they pose certification obstacles.o
In demarcating the sometimes blurry line between liability and
damages issues," Sacred Heart is likely to be the new starting point for
any district court in the Eleventh Circuit weighing the familiar
argument that mere individualized damages issues will not preclude
class certification.4 2 Finally, though relegated to almost a postscript in
the opinion, the court's admonition that parties with high-value damage
claims face more difficulty in showing the superiority of class certifica-

37. 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). Klay is discussed in Thomas M. Byrne & Suzanne
M. Alford, Class Actions, 2004 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 56 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1220-26
(2005).
38. 601 F.3d at 1176; cf In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990).
("Commonality among class members on issues of causation and damages can be achieved
only by lifting the description of the claims to a level of generality that tears them from
their substantively required moorings to actual causation and discrete injury. Procedures
can be devised to implement such generalizations, but not without alteration of substantive
principle.").
39. See Sacred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1175-76.
40. Id. at 1180 (quoting Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2007),
and citing Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
41. On this point, in Owner-OperatorIndependent Drivers Ass'n v. Landstar System,
Inc., 622 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2010), the court vacated its earlier opinion in OwnerOperatorIndependent Drivers Ass'n v. Landstar System, Inc., 541 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.
2008). The 2010 decision, however, did not disturb the class action rulings in the earlier
case, including that the need for actual damage calculations for each class member made
class certification inappropriate. Owner-Operator,622 F.3d at 1328. The now-vacated
opinion is discussed in Thomas M. Byrne, ClassActions, 2008 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 60
MERCER L. REV. 1163, 1166-67 (2009).
42. See, e.g., Bertulli v. Indep. Ass'n of Cont' Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 297-98 (5th Cir.
2001).
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tion to alternatives43 is a word to the wise likely to be frequently cited
in future cases."
II.

REVERSALS OF FORTUNE: LOWERY AND CAPPUCCITTI

No review of 2010 class action developments in the Eleventh Circuit
would be complete without noting the demise of the court's controversial
removal decision in Lowery v. Alabama Power Co.," which had its
broadest impact in class action removals. In Pretka v. Kolter City
Plaza II, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit unraveled at least two key aspects
of Lowery. Pretka did not overrule Lowery entirely, but the court in
Pretkadismissed significant parts of the analysis in Lowery as unpersuasive, non-binding dicta."
First, Pretka rejected the Lowery "receipt from the plaintiff' rule that
limited a district court's jurisdictional amount analysis in a removed
diversity case to the four corners of the complaint and to information
provided by the plaintiff on the amount in controversy.4 8 Pretka held,
to the contrary, that "[diefendants may introduce their own affidavits,
declarations, or other documentation."" The court also observed that
"it has never been the jurisdictional rule that a defendant may remove
a diversity case seeking unliquidated damages only when the plaintiff
is the source of facts or evidence on the value of the case.""o Second,
Pretka held that a district court, contrary to language in Lowery, may
consider evidence filed after removal in making its jurisdictional
determination."
The Eleventh Circuit held that the language in
Lowery appeared to conflict with the court's earlier decision in Sierminski v. 'ransouth FinancialCorp.,5 but that the Lowery language was
mere dicta." The court also noted that its post-Lowery decision in
Thomas v. Bank of America Corp." should not be read as endorsing

43. See Sacred Heart,601 F.3d at 1184.
44. See generally Andrea Joy Parker, Note, Dareto Compare:DeterminingWhat "Other
Available Methods" Can Be Considered Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)'s Superiority
Requirement, 44 GA. L. REV. 581 (2010).
45. 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007).
46. 608 F.3d 744 (11th Cir.2010). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge Ed
Carnes. Id. at 747.
47. Id. at 767-68.
48. Id. at 755-56.
49. Id. at 755.
50. Id. at 765.
51. Id. at 772.
52. 216 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2000).
53. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 773.
54. 570 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2009).
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Lowery's "receipt from the plaintiff" rule but instead as turning on the
deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defendant in that case in
support of jurisdiction."
The foundation for the court's analysis in Pretka is a reading of the
removal procedure statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).56 As the court explained, that subsection contemplates two opportunities for removal."
The first paragraph addresses civil actions that are removable at the
time of commencement and provides for a thirty-day removal window."
The second paragraph of the same subsection concerns civil actions that
are not originally removable but become so after receipt by the
defendant of a paper "from which it may first be ascertained that the
case is one which is or has become removable."" The court pointed out
that Lowery was a "second paragraph" removal, effected long after the
case was initiated.0 Pretka, on the other hand, was a "first paragraph"
removal of a putative class action filed in Florida state court over a
failed condominium project.6' The defendant in Pretka removed the
case based on CAFA. 62 With its notice of removal, the defendant filed
a declaration concerning the amount in controversy, which was not
specified in the complaint, and later filed additional evidence in
opposition to the plaintiffs motion to remand. The district court held

55. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 761n.19. This distinction between Bank ofAmerica and Lowery
was also suggested in last year's survey. Thomas M. Byrne & Stacey A. McGavin, Class
Actions, 2009 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 61 MERCER L. REV. 1055, 1060 (2010).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). Section 1446(b) provides as follows:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty
days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of
the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the
defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required
to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal
may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become
removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction
conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the
action.
Id.
57. Pretka, 608 F.3d at 756-57.
58. Id. at 757.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 757-58.
61. Id. at 747.
62. Id. at 749; see also Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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that it could not consider the declarations filed by the defendant because
none of them were a document received from the plaintiffs. The district
court also held that it was impermissible under Lowery to consider
evidence of the amount in controversy not submitted with the notice of
removal.6 ' The Eleventh Circuit rejected both of these holdings."
Judge Pryor fully concurred with Judge Carnes's opinion for the court,
but wrote separately to take on another holding of Lowery, that district
courts may not allow post-removal discovery regarding the amount in
controversy.65 Judge Pryor noted that the discovery question was not
presented by Pretka but will eventually have to be revisited.66 Judge
Pryor quoted from critical commentary on the Lowery anti-discovery
holding in the 2007 edition of this Annual Survey.67
Pretka is a landmark opinion that restores balance to removal
procedure within the Eleventh Circuit.68 The opinion also offers an
interesting exegesis of the meaning of dicta that is likely to be frequently
consulted in the future by Eleventh Circuit practitioners.
Class action practitioners saw another reversal of fortune in Cappuccitti v. DirecTM Inc."o In its first opinion in the case, the court
interpreted CAFA to require at least one plaintiff in a class action to
meet the standard diversity jurisdiction amount in controversy
requirement of $75,000." The case involved a claim by a DirecTV
subscriber that DirecTV charged fees that were proscribed by Georgia
law for early termination of their subscriptions.72 The complaint
sought more than CAFA's $5 million jurisdictional minimum.
In vacating its first opinion three months later, the court held that
although there were additional requirements for a "mass action" to be
brought under CAFA, a class action could be brought either originally or

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Pretka, 608 F.2d at 749-50.
Id. at 767-68.
Id. at 774 (Pryor, J., concurring).
Id. at 776.
Id. (discussing Thomas M. Byrne, ClassActions, 2007 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 59

MERCER L. REv. 1117 (2008)).

68. The court applied Pretka later in the year in Roe v. Michelin North America, Inc.,
613 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2010), in upholding the denial of a motion to remand where the
complaint specified no damage amount. Id. at 1059.
69. See Pretka, 608 F.3d at 762-67.
70. 623 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 2010) thereinafter CappuccittiII] (per curiam). The court's
initial opinion, Cappuccitti v. DirecTV, Inc., 611 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter
Cappuccitti 1], vacated, 623 F.3d 1118, was authored by Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat. Id. at
1253.
71. Cappuccitti1, 611 F.3d at 1256; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
72. CappuccittiII, 623 F.3d at 1121.
73. Id. at 1122 & n.8.

20111

CLASS ACTIONS

1115

on removal without any individual plaintiff's claim exceeding $75,000.74
The court then proceeded to examine the arbitration question and
determined, under the Federal Arbitration Act, that the arbitration
agreement was enforceable." The court rejected Cappuccitti's claim
that requiring him to arbitrate individually the validity of the early
cancellation fee would be unconscionable under Georgia law." The
court identified the sine qua non of Cappuccitti's argument to be the
unavailability of attorneys' fees and costs," but pointed out that the
Georgia Fair Business Practices Act of 1975 7 provided for an award of
reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses to a prevailing party.s Considering all the remedies available to Cappuccitti under Georgia law when
he contracted with DirecTV and the arbitration service's rules that
provided for an award of attorneys' fees and litigation expenses as
allowed by state law, the court decided that the order denying arbitration had to be vacated.81
III.

PRECLUSiVE EFFECTS OF CLASS SETTLEMENTS AND JUDGMENTS:
MANAGED CARE, BORRERO, THOMAS, AND BROWN

The year also saw several decisions examining the preclusive effect of
a prior class settlement or judgment. Like Sacred HeartHealth Systems,
Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Services, Inc.,82 and Klay v.
Humana,Inc.,83 three of these cases involved claims against insurance
74. Id. at 1122 & n.5.
75. U.S.C. tit. 9 (2006).
76. See CappuccittiII, 623 F.3d at 1123-27.
77. Id. at 1125-27.
78. Id. at 1125.
79. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 to -407 (2009).
80. CappuccittiII, 623 F.3d at 1125; see also O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(d).
81. CappuccittiII, 623 F.3d at 1126-27. The court also examined the enforceability of
an arbitration agreement and class action waiver in Pendergastv. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592
F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 2010). The court, however, did not decide on the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement, instead certifying to the Florida Supreme Court several questions
regarding procedural and substantive unconscionability of the contract at issue. Id. at
1143-44. Pendergast involved claims by a consumer against a wireless service provider
where the terms and conditions of the wireless provider's contract contained both an
arbitration provision and a class action waiver. Although the plaintiff did not contest the
arbitration clause itself, he argued that the class action waiver was both procedurally and
substantively unconscionable and that, because the provisions were not severable, the
arbitration clause also was unenforceable. Id. at 1121. After reviewing the various terms
of the contract in detail, the court reviewed Florida law and determined that the relevant
law regarding procedural and substantive unconscionability was not sufficiently clear to
determine the enforceability of the class action waiver at issue. Id. at 1143-44.
82. 601 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2010).
83. 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004).

1116

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

companies that had been consolidated for pretrial purposes in the
Managed Care Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)" in the Southern District
of Florida. And two of these opinions, Borrero v. United HealthCare,
Inc.' and In re Managed Care Litigation," dealt with the preclusive
effects of different dispositions of the same underlying class action,
styled Shane v. Humana, Inc.," out of which the opinion in Klay
arose.' In both Borrero and In re Managed Care, the Eleventh Circuit
reversed an order of the district court giving preclusive effect to the
previous disposition in Shane." Shane involved a second amended
consolidated class action complaint brought by the healthcare providers
in the MDL that asserted breach of contract and RICO90 conspiracy
claims against various insurance companies based on an alleged
conspiracy by the insurance companies to underpay the healthcare
providers." Although the district court had certified classes for both
the state-law and the RICO claims, the Eleventh Circuit, in its decision
in Klay, concluded that only the RICO claims were appropriate for class
certification.9 2 After the Shane plaintiffs amended their complaint to
include only the class action RICO claims, the district court granted
summary judgment on these claims."
In Borrerothe Eleventh Circuit considered the preclusive effect of this
dismissal on seven actions that had been brought by physicians and
their representative organizations against United HealthCare (United)
while the Shane case was pending.94 These actions, all of which alleged
that United had breached its contracts with the providers "by not paying
them the full contracted rate for services rendered to United's insureds,"
had been placed on the "'tag-along' docket" in the MDL and stayed

84. In re Managed Care Litigation, No. 00-MD-1334 (S.D. Fla. April 17, 2000) (order
transferring cases).
85. 610 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2010). The opinion of the court was authored by Chief
Judge Joel F. Dubina. Id. at 1299.
86. 605 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
87. In re Managed Care Litigation, No. 00-MD-1334 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19,2002) (provider
plaintiffs' second amended class action complaint); see also In re Managed Care, 605 F.3d
at 1148.
88. See In re Managed Care, 605 F.3d at 1147; Borrero, 610 F.3d at 1300-01; Klay, 382
F.3d at 1249-50.
89. Compare Borrero, 610 F.3d at 1311, with In re Managed Care, 605 F.3d at 1152.
90. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2006).
91. In re Managed Care, 605 F.3d at 1148; Borrero, 610 F.3d at 1300-01.
92. Klay, 382 F.3d at 1276.
93. In re Managed Care Litigation, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff'd sub
nom. Shane v. Humana, Inc., 228 F. App'x 927 (11th Cir. 2007).
94. Borrero, 610 F.3d at 1299-1300.
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pending the outcome of Shane, in which United was a defendant."s
After the grant of summary judgment in Shane, the district court
dismissed these tag-along actions on res judicata grounds."
The
Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that these claims did not involve
the same causes of action as those dismissed in Shane."
After concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the
action," the court applied the familiar requirements of res judicata and
concluded that the tag-along actions were not precluded by the Shane
dismissal because the cases did not "involve the same causes of
action." 9 The court reviewed its past decisions applying this requirement, noting that various labels have been used to describe the proper
test with no meaningful difference between these standards.o While
other circuits have used a "transactional approach," the court concluded
that the Eleventh Circuit generally conducts "an evaluation of any
commonality in the 'nucleus of operative facts' of the actions [by lining]
up the former and current cases side-by-side to assess their factual
similarities." 0'o The court noted that this case presented "a close
question regarding the factual similarities between the two cases."'o2
The factual allegations in the RICO suit and the suits at issue were
"substantially similar," and some of the allegations were virtually
identical in both complaints.103 Moreover, the court indicated that the
mere fact that the claims were for breach of contract rather than
conspiracy would not be enough to conclude the cases were not closely
related. o
Relying heavily on its class certification decision in Klay, however, the
court concluded that the cases were not similar enough to be considered

95. Id. at 1300.
96. Id. at 1301.
97. Id. at 1299, 1301.
98. Id. at 1301. The court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction existed because
the claims were completely preempted by section 502(a) of the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006). Borrero, 610 F.3d at 1301.
99. Borrero, 610 F.3d at 1306 (quoting In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296
(11th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court first rejected the providers'
argument that the district court was not a court of competent jurisdiction because the
existence of arbitration clauses in their provider agreements with United deprived the
district court of jurisdiction over their state-law claims, as "[tihe arbitrability of claims is
not jurisdictional." Id. at 1307.
100. Id. at 1308.
101. Id. at 1308-09.
102. Id. at 1309.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1309, 1310 n.6.

1118

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

the same causes of action."os In reversing the grant of class certification on the state-law claims, the court in Klay had concluded that the
RICO claims and the state-law claims were at best "tangentially
relevant":
We noted that "[tihe facts that the defendants conspired to underpay
doctors, and that they programmed their computer systems to
frequently do so in a variety of ways, do nothing to establish that any
individual doctor was underpaid on any particular occasion." This
court went on to state that "[wihile allegations concerning the
defendants' conspiracy to underpay doctors, or their policy of aiding
and abetting each other in underpaying doctors, went directly to
material elements of each individual plaintiff's RICO claim, here they
are, at best, merely circumstantial evidence tangentially relevant to
each individual plaintiffs breach of contract claim." We observe the
potential inconsistency in emphasizing the differences between the
types of claims so emphatically in Klay and a decision here resting on
the notion that these claims arise from the same nucleus of operative
fact. That the evidence presented in the prior action is only "tangentially relevant" to the claims like those made here argues against
finding an identity between the causes of action.'0o
The court also noted that the "analysis of the claim identity does not
offend the underlying policy goals of the res judicata doctrine," given
that the "court, in the midst of the first case, made such stark pronouncements about the contrasts between the types of claims initially
and later asserted.""o' Moreover, the decision in Klay had already
"created whatever judicial inefficiencies might result in allowing these
claims to proceed by splitting the claims made in the case for class
action certification."o The court also focused on the lack of prejudice
to United, which "should have expected no repose when the district court
resolved only the RICO claims, because it was on notice that this court
viewed the RICO claims and contract-based claims as distinct."1 09 This
expectation, however, is not so clear. The court's almost exclusive
reliance on select language in Klay seems to avoid the type of hard
factual comparison that the court's description of the analytic approach
seems to require. Klay analyzed the existence of common issues of fact
among the individual plaintiff's separate state-law claims, not the
existence of common issues of fact between the state-law claims and the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1309-10.
Id. (alterations in the original) (citations omitted) (quoting Klay, 382 F.3d at 1264).
Id. at 1310.
Id.
Id.
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RICO claims."o On the other hand, a holding that the claims were
precluded would in effect have given class treatment to claims that were
specifically removed from the class certification order, negating the
denial of class certification on those claims.
In In re Managed Care, the court also dealt with the preclusive effect
of the Shane litigation on breach of contract claims, although by way of
the release language of a settlement agreement rather than the
principles of res judicata."' Prior to the court's opinion in Klay and
the subsequent grant of summary judgment, the insurance company
Aetna and its subsidiaries reached a class settlement agreement with
the Shane class.112 The settlement agreement defined the class,
provided for opt-out notice, and included the release of "all claims arising
on or before the Preliminary Approval Date, that are, were or could have
been asserted against any of the Released Parties based on or arising
from the factual allegations of the Complaint.""' Based on this
release, the district court later enjoined Doctors Health, a medical
provider that was not a named plaintiff in the Shane action, from
pursuing a breach of contract action against an Aetna subsidiary,
NYLCare Health Plans (NYLCare). The claim was based on NYLCare's
alleged breach of its contract with Doctors Health, which had managed
NYLCare's Medicare HMO plan in certain states pursuant to a threeyear contract. After NYLCare became a subsidiary of Aetna, NYLCare
discontinued its Medicare HMO plan in this region, leaving no plan for
Doctors Health to manage." The district court concluded that Doctors
Health's claims were released in the settlement and enjoined Doctors
Health from pursuing the claim in an adversary proceeding in a
Maryland bankruptcy court.'
On appeal, Doctors Health argued that its claims were not barred
because it was not a member of the class, it had not received an
adequate opt-out notice, and its claims were not within the scope of the
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, even assuming
release."'
Doctors Health was in the class and had received adequate notice, the
claims were not released because they did not fall within the scope of the
language releasing claims "based on or arising from the factual

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
release

See Klay, 382 F.3d at 1251, 1261-68.
See In re Managed Care, 605 F.3d at 1148.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1149.
Id. Doctors Health also argued that NYLCare was estopped from raising the
because it had not done so in the bankruptcy court. Id.
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While the Shane complaint

that the managed-care companies underpaid providers of medical
services, the breach of contract claim resolved in the adversary action
hinged on Doctors Health's allegation that NYLCare breached its
Medicare HMO management agreement with Doctors Health by failing
to renew its Medicare agreements with the government and then
prematurely terminating the Medicare HMO management agreement
it had with Doctors Health.n8
Shane involved contracts between service providers and managed-care
companies rather than Medicare HMO management contracts like that
between Doctors Health and NYLCare, under which Doctors Health
administered the managed-care company's insurance plan."' The
court also pointed out that the release language did "not release claims
that could have been asserted based on or arising out of factual
allegations that could have been added by amendment to the Shane
Complaint," but instead released only "claims that could have been
asserted based on or arising from the factual allegations of the [Shane]
Complaint." 20
The court, however, was not entirely hostile to class settlements in
2010. In another preclusion case involving the same MDL, Thomas v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n,'2 ' the court again dealt with the
preclusive effect of a class action settlement, this time concluding that
the claims at issue were precluded by the settlement.12 2 In 2003,

117. Id. at 1150 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at 1151.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1151-52 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). InHesse
v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit similarly reversed the
dismissal of claims based on a class settlement agreement, concluding that the claims did
not fall within the scope of the release because they did not share the "identical factual
predicate" as those in the previous action. Id. at 591-92. Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in
In re Managed Care, the Ninth Circuit focused primarily on Kansas law on preclusion and
res judicata rather than on the language of the release. See id. at 591. In other circuits,
2010 saw mixed results in the approval of class action settlements. See, e.g., In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 2010) (reversing approval of settlement
as unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate); In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333,
336, 357 (3d Cir. 2010) (upholding approval of settlement and release contained in
settlement). The Third Circuit vacated for hearing en banc a decision that rejected a
settlement on the basis that class certification was not warranted. Sullivan v. DB Invs.,
Inc., 613 F.3d 134, vacated en banc, 619 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2010).
121. 594 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2010). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge
William H. Pryor Jr. Id. at 816.
122. Id. at 816.
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several physicians filed a nationwide class action complaint against Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Association, Inc. (BCBS) and its member plans,
asserting RICO claims based on allegations that BCBS had conspired to
improperly deny, delay, and reduce payments to physicians and through
The parties reached a class
various types of improper conduct."
settlement agreement and release, which was approved by the district
court. 124
Around the time that the settlement was reached, a physician who had
failed to opt out of the settlement brought an action against a BCBS
plan in Illinois state court asserting claims of breach of conduct, tortious
interference, and defamation.125 The physician specifically "alleged
that the Corporation had made false statements to his patients
regarding its reasons for refusing to pay for medical services that he had
rendered."'2 6 The BCBS plan filed a motion in the MDL court for an
order to enforce the injunction, and the district court enjoined the
prosecution of the breach of contract claims but not the tort claims. 127
On appeal by the BCBS plan, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the aspect
of the order governing the tort claims, concluding that these claims fell
within the scope of the release because they were related to matters
addressed in the class action.'2 8 The court noted that the tort claims
were "based on allegations that the Corporation engaged in improper
practices to deny and delay payments to [the physician] and that these

123. Id. at 816-17.
124. Id. at 817. The release covered all causes of action
arising on or before the Effective Date, that are, were or could have been asserted
against any of the Released Parties by reason of, arising out of, or in any way
related to any of the facts, acts, events, transactions, occurrences, courses of
conduct, business practices, representations, omissions, circumstances or other
matters referenced in the Action, or addressed in this Agreement.
Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 818.
128. Id. at 821-22. The BCBS plan also filed a motion for the physician to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt for prosecuting the released claims. Id. at 818. In
ruling on the injunction, the district court instructed the physician to withdraw the breach
of contract claim within twenty days or it would revisit the contempt motion. Id. The
physician cross-appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it did not have
jurisdiction over the appeal of this portion of the order. Id. at 819. The order was not final
because the district court had not held the physician in contempt or imposed any sanction.
Id. In a companion case, the court similarly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over
the district court's denial of a physician's motion for permission to prosecute his action as
barred by the release. Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823, 826 (11th
Cir. 2010).
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practices caused him to lose existing patients as well as referrals."129
The court specifically held that it was not relevant that the tort claims
depended on a different legal theory than the claims in the class action
or would require proof of matters additional to or different from those
required in the class action claims.3 o The court also discussed the
temporal element of the release language, noting that "the relevant
inquiry . . is not whether the acts giving rise to the complaint occurred
after the class action was filed or the settlement agreement was entered,
but whether they occurred after the effective date of the settlement
agreement."' 3 Given the similar factual comparisons required by the
court in Borrero and Thomas, it is difficult to reconcile the decision in
Borrero that the state-law claims were only tangentially related to the
RICO claims with the opposite conclusion in Thomas.
Finally, in Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1' the court considered the preclusive effect of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.,"' a decades-old tobacco case in which that
court had decertified the class but left standing certain factual findings
to be used offensively by individual plaintiffs.'"' The trial court in
Engle had developed a three-part trial plan, Phase I of which was a
year-long trial involving "common issues relating . .. to the defendants'
At the end of
conduct and the general health effects of smoking."'
Phase I, the jury answered almost every question on the verdict form in
a manner adverse to the defendants."' Because of the limited nature
of Phase I, however, "the jury was not asked whether the class had
proven any of its claims; it did not decide if the defendants were liable
to anyone on any cause of action.""' The Florida Supreme Court later
decertified the Engle class for purposes of Phase III of the trial but let
stand the majority of the findings in Phase I, noting that "[cilass
members can choose to initiate individual damages actions and the

129. Thomas, 594 F.3d at 822.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 611 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2010). The opinion of the court was authored by Judge
Ed Carnes. Id. at 1326. Judge R. Lanier Anderson authored a separate concurring opinion
that was incorporated in full into the opinion of the court. Id. at 1336 n.11.
133. 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
134. Id. at 1277.
135. Brown, 611 F.3d at 1326-27 (omission in original) (quoting Engle, 945 So. 2d at
1256) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 1327. The jury found, for example, "that smoking cigarettes causes 20 of
23 listed diseases or medical conditions." Id.
137. Id.
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Phase I common core findings we approved above will have resjudicata
effect in those trials." 3
The plaintiffs subsequently filed individual actions against the tobacco
companies, requiring the court to determine the extent of the res
judicata effect of the Phase I findings.139 The district court issued an
order that the Phase I findings could not be used to establish any
element of the plaintiffs' claims but reserved judgment on whether the
findings could have any other preclusive effect. 40 On interlocutory
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's determination
as premature and remanded to the district court to reexamine the proper
extent of the preclusive effect of each factual finding.14 ' The court
reviewed Florida law on res judicata, which was not disputed by the
parties,'4 2 who agreed that the Florida Supreme Court intended to
refer to issue preclusion rather than claim preclusion, and that only
issues that were "actually adjudicated" in the earlier lawsuit could not
be relitigated.14 ' The subject of contention was the precise facts
actually found by the jury.'44 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the
entire trial record, but nothing outside of it, could be considered for
purposes of determining whether a specific factual issue was determined
in the plaintiffs' favor."' Because the district court had not specifically determined the scope of the facts found in the Phase I proceedings,
the time was premature for the district court "to address whether those
findings by themselves establish any elements of the plaintiffs'
claims."14 6 Beyond this instruction, however, the Eleventh Circuit left
"it to the district court to apply Florida law as we have outlined it and
decide in the first instance precisely what facts are established when
preclusive effect is given to the approved findings."" Brown again
demonstrates the difficulty in determining the precise preclusive effect

138. Id. at 1328-29 (citing Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1269).
139. Id. at 1329.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1336. Before addressing the preclusive effect of the Phase I findings, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the court lacked jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine, which precludes the losing party in a state court action from seeking
appellate review in a federal district court by "claimling] that the state judgment itself
violates the loser's federal rights." Id. at 1330 (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1005-06 (1994)); see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 261 U.S. 114 (1923); D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
142. See Brown, 611 F.3d at 1334.
143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1335.
146. Id. at 1336.
147. Id.

1124

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

of a prior class disposition. Whether a settlement or a judgment, the
preclusion analysis requires a detailed examination of the facts and
allegations at issue in the two cases.

